This paper introduces power default reasoning (PDR), a framework for nonmonotonic reasoning based on the domain-theoretic idea of modeling default rules with partial-information in a higher-order setting. PDR lifts a non-monotonic operator at the base (syntactic) level to a well-behaved, almost monotonic operator in the higher-order space of the Smyth power-domain -effectively a space of sets of models. Working in the model space allows us to prove the dichotomy theorem and the extension splitting theorem, leading to a more well-behaved logic and (modulo the usual complexity conjectures) a less complex logic than standard default logic. Specifically, we prove that skeptical normal default inference is a problem complete for co-NP(3) in the Boolean hierarchy for strict propositional logic and NP(4)-complete in general. These results (by changing the underlying semantics) contrasts favorably with similar results of Gottlob [9] , who proves that standard skeptical default reasoning is Π P 2 -complete. Furthermore, we show that the skeptical non-monotonic consequence relation, defined using our domain-theoretic semantics, obey all of the laws for preferential consequence relations defined by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor. In particular, we get the property of being able to reason by cases, and the so-called law of cautious monotony. Both of these laws fail for the standard propositional default logic of Reiter [22] , but hold in PDR as a consequence of the dichotomy theorem and the extension splitting theorem.
Introduction

Background
Non-monotonic reasoning is a significant research area spanning the artificial intelligence community and the community in logic programming and deductive databases. The term refers to drawing conclusions using "defaults", or "rules of thumb", applied in the presence of incomplete information. Since these rules might be applied in unanticipated exceptional situations, the conclusions drawn from them might have to be modified or discarded. This phenomenon is what is commonly called non-monotonicity.
In this paper we follow the standard practice of ignoring the need to retract incorrectly drawn conclusions, focusing instead on the use of pseudo-logical inference rules, and/or "defeasible" conditionals, in order to allow database systems to derive conclusions or to answer queries in the absence of explicitly stored hard information.
A key problem is to identify what we mean by "absence of information". This is where the use of Scott's domain theory enters the picture, as it is concerned with the mathematical properties of partial information, typically exhibiting stages in the computation of a partial function as they evolve under the iteration controlled by a program. We wondered if the explicitness of the theory of domains would allow us to identify, model-theoretically, the places where default rule application was taking place in the absence of hard information. The idea is not original with us -the database research group at the University of Pennsylvania has pioneered the use of Scott domain theory as a tool for database query language design. A good overview can be found in Libkin [15] . In fact, one key idea of our semantics (updating) is taken from this work.
Domain theory shows us how to model successive stages in the computation of a partial function (extending its domain of definition at each stage) by iterating an operator F on partial functions which is monotonic: if the partial function f can be extended to the partial function g, then F (f ) can be extended to F (g). A standard theorem says that the operator F has a least fixpoint: a function f * such that F (f * ) = f * and such that any other fixpoint of F extends f * . A natural move is to consider non-monotonic analogues of the least-fixpoint construction. We have found that Reiter's extension operator is just such a construction; in fact, one which appropriately generalizes to arbitrary Scott domains. (The fact that this operator could be a very general one was first noticed in a paper by Marek, Nerode, and Remmel [16] .) In Reiter's system, extensions of a logical theory are obtained with respect to a set Σ of defaults of the form P : Q R , which are interpreted as proof rules with the informal interpretation: If P has been proved, and Q is consistent, then infer R. Here P , Q, and R are ground first-order formulas, with respect to a first-order theory with standard rules of proof as well as the default rules.
In this paper we focus on normal default rules of the form P : Q Q , which have pleasanter theoretical properties (it will be seen, though, that we do not stick to the case of first-order logic). More work is needed for general default rules and it is not clear which parts of our results can be extended to the general case.
Let W be a theory (typically, the set of logical consequences of a single formula). An extension of W is a theory E obtained as follows. Let η(W, X) be the least possible deductively closed theory (i.e., closed under the standard proof rules) containing W and closed under application of the default rules, as long as application of any rule gives a theory consistent with X. Then if η(W, E) = E we say that E is an extension of W . We generalize this idea by letting W, X and so on range over an arbitrary Scott domain. In Reiter's case, the domain is the collection of deductively closed theories, ordered by set-theoretic inclusion.
The basic idea of our paper, explained in a concrete setting, is this. A (syntactic) system of normal defaults is just a finite collection Σ of pairs of the form τ ; θ, where τ, θ are ordinary propositional formulas using "and", "or", and "not" connectives. We read these in the usual way: "normally, if τ then θ." We also have an "initial" formula φ representing given background information, and a formula ψ which may or may not be skeptically entailed by φ and Σ. The initial formula (in fact every ordinary formula) is interpreted using Kleene's three-valued truth tables. This results in the "initial disjunctive state" being the set of all partial truth assignments satisfying φ, which is a so-called compact open set in the Scott topology over the domain D of partial truth assignments -i.e., a Smyth powerdomain element.
Instead of using syntactic defaults as proof rules, we show how to induce semantic defaults from the syntactic presentation of default constraints in Σ. These defaults act on the space of model sets, but this space is just the Smyth powerdomain, which is again a Scott domain. Extensions of a normal default set can be defined over any Scott domain, so this works perfectly well for the Smyth powerdomain. Extensions provide a fixpoint construction for the state transformers, from which skeptical entailment can be defined easily.
This model-theoretic semantics for default rules inherits two key ideas of logical systems built on domain theory. One is the concept of model-based partiality of information. Our general perspective is this. We believe that human reasoning is in large part model-driven, in that inferences are made about mental "pictures" or "models". These models are in turn reflections of situations [4] , portions of the real world in which objects stand in certain relations to each other, but in which not all issues need be settled. The idea of model-based nonmonotonicity is that from evidence garnered from one of these partial situations or partial mental models, one applies pre-stored "constraints" or "rules", in order to fill in information which may be missing. This can be done in a nondeterministic manner, so that the filling-in process can be completed in more than one way, resulting in new pictures (generally inconsistent with each other), about which one can then reason, plan, or act. Nonmonotonicity arises when one is forced to alter these filled-in pictures in light of new actual evidence.
The other idea is type metamorphosis, which refers to the way of treating a higher-order object just as another ordinary object. "Programs as data" is a typical example of type-metamorphosis underlying the whole area of domain theory. In our approach this works in the reverse direction: a default rule of the base type is lifted to a set of rule of a higher-type, i.e., the Smyth powerdomain, thus the name power defaults. This approach allows us to obtain robust structural properties on extensions and by capitalizing on these, to derive new and surprisingly low complexity results. We summarize the results in the next subsection.
Overview of results
The results of this paper are of three kinds: properties of power default extensions, algorithms and complexity for propositional default reasoning, and structural properties of the induced non-monotonic consequence relation.
Results of the first kind include the dichotomy theorem and the extension splitting theorem. The dichotomy theorem states that when a set of default constraints on a Scott domain D is lifted as a set of power defaults Γ on the Smyth powerdomain of D, P(D), an element (i.e. compact, saturated set) either has a safe, unique Γ-extension, or else the multiple Γ-extensions are all singleton-generated. The extension splitting theorem states that any extension of the union of two compact open sets can be split into the union of two corresponding extensions.
For the algorithmic properties of PDR, we consider problem instances (φ, Σ, ψ), where φ and ψ are propositional formulas, and Σ is a set of default constraints; the question is whether or not every model-theoretic extension of the set of models of φ is contained in the set of models of ψ. We prove that skeptical default inference, with normal defaults, is a problem complete for co-NP(3), the third level of the Boolean hierarchy [6] . (A related problem is shown to be complete for NP (4) .) This means that the class of valid instances of our problem can be written as a set (
where L 1 and L 3 are in co-NP, and L 2 is in NP. Operationally speaking, this means that to solve an instance of skeptical entailment, we will have to chain together at most two calls to an NP oracle; and in fact SAT is an obvious candidate for such an oracle. The best previous result using variants of the standard semantics for defaults is by Gottlob [10] , who shows that for the stationary semantics of default logic, due to Przymusinska and Przymusinski [21] one obtains a P N P [log n] complete inference problem.
Here is a brief account of how the structural properties of extensions relate to algorithmic complexity.
• We isolate an important subclass of problem instances for which there is a simple co-NP test for deciding skeptical non-monotonic entailment. These are the so-called safe instances. Roughly, a safe instance is a model (partial truth assignment) for φ which satisfies all the defaults τ ; θ as if they were standard material implications. The entailment algorithm only works correctly if we know ahead of time that we have safe problem instances. It is NP-complete to tell if we do have such an instance, but there do exist polynomial criteria which we can impose on instances to guarantee safety.
• All other instances of the problem are the so-called non-safe instances. If we know ahead of time that we are looking at non-safe instances, then again we have a co-NP algorithm for deciding non-monotonic entailment. In fact, non-monotonic inference is identical to monotonic entailment in the non-safe setting.
• To justify our algorithms, we use the Dichotomy Theorem mentioned above.
This result shows us the structure of our model-theoretic extensions in both the safe and the unsafe setting. Since either there is a safe instance, in which case there is a unique default extension of a set M of assignments, or else no instances are safe and the multiple extensions are each singleton sets {g} of maximal (total) truth assignments g ∈ M, we can use the safe-instance testing algorithm to classify problem instances into just these two cases. Thus we need only three NP-oracles: one to classify the instances as safe or unsafe, and the other two to finish the reasoning as above. In fact, only two oracles need to be chained together in the strict case where the always true propositional is not part of the instance, and three oracle chaining is needed for the general case involving true.
Standard propositional default reasoning runs into problems with repeated consistency checks, having to use an NP oracle at each step. Our algorithm avoids these checks, except for the safety test at the beginning. This was an unexpected property of our semantics. In the case of conjunctive systems, where φ and ψ are in disjunctive normal form (DNF), and the conclusions θ of the default rules contain no disjunctions, the skeptical inference problem is poly-nomial [25] . This contrasts sharply with results of Kautz and Selman [12] , who show NP-hardness results for similar (normal) instances in standard default logic.
As for structural properties, we prove the following set of laws for the skeptical non-monotonic consequence relation, including default reasoning by cases, and the Cautious Monotony [14] . Both of these laws fail in standard default logic.
• Supraclassicality: p ≤ q ⇒ p ; q.
• Left Logical Equivalence:
• Cautious Cut:
• Cautious Monotony:
• Right And:
• Left Or: (p ∨ q) ; r ⇔ (p ; r) ∧ (q ; r).
• Right Or: p ; (q ∨ r) ⇒ (p ; q) ∨ (p ; r).
Previous work
Buneman and his students [5] pioneered the use of domain theory in database applications. Libkin's thesis [15] contains a very good overview. The Buneman school considers many more powerdomain constructions besides the Smyth powerdomain.
In artificial intelligence and natural language Pollard and Moshier [20] considered a number of ways to use powerdomains to model grammatical inference, though the first use of partial-order techniques in a setting related to artificial intelligence, was by Pereira and Shieber [18] in providing a semantics for disjunctive feature structures in computational linguistics. Our semantics was anticipated as well by Ait-Kaci [2] , but (for his -terms) he did not use domain theory explicitly. Another implicit use of our semantics is in a paper by Gelfond et al. [8] , who introduce a notion of disjunctive defaults in order to overcome certain problematic examples involving disjunctive reasoning in default logic.
This paper is an extended and integrated account of results reported in two previous conference papers by the authors. One is [25] 
Plan of the paper
Section 2 provides background definitions in complexity theory, domain theory, three-valued logic, Smyth powerdomain, and default domain theory. Section 3 introduces power defaults. Section 4 presents the Dichotomy Theorem and the Extension Splitting Theorem, fundamental properties related to extensions of power defaults. Section 5 contains the study of the complexity of propositional power default reasoning. Section 6 studies the non-monotonic consequence relation derived from power defaults. The last section concludes by putting our results in perspective, and by briefly mentioning some experimental results.
Background definitions
We recall Kleene's three-valued propositional logic first so that we can use it as running example to illustrate a variety of concepts. We will get back to this logic again for complexity of propositional power default reasoning in Section 5.
Three-valued logic
The language of propositional, three-valued, logic with respect to a given (countable) set of propositional variables Var can be concisely defined by using the BNF notation:
Strings in this language will be called propositional formulas or just formulas. This syntax is the same as that of standard propositional logic. The difference lies in the semantics. The meaning of a propositional formula is specified by its behavior on partial truth assignments (ptas). A pta is a function e : Var → {0, 1, ⊥}, with 1 understood as "true", 0 as "false", and ⊥ as "undefined". Note that we use truth values 0 and 1 in truth assignments, instead of false and true. This distinction is important. While true and false belong to the syntax, 0 and 1 belong to the semantics, and they are not to be confused conceptually.
It is customary to describe a pta by a string of variables and its complements. For example, abcd represents the pta which assigns a and b to 1, and c and d to 0.
The set of all ptas forms a complete partial order (cpo -see 2.2) [Var → {0, 1, ⊥}] by defining the order pointwise: e e if e(x) e (x) for every x ∈ Var, where the truth values are ordered by letting ⊥ 0 and ⊥ 1 (0 and 1 will thus be incomparable). We write T for this cpo.
There are several ways to look at the three-valued semantics. One is that it fixes a three-valued mapping for each formula. The second view is that it determines a mapping such that, given any formula, given any pta, a truth value is determined. The third view is that it is completely determined by the meaning of the logical connectives ∨, ∧, ¬. However, once the meanings of these connectives are fixed, the previous two interpretations are also fixed.
The truth tables for ∨, ∧ and ¬, usually attributed to Kleene, are given as follows.
These truth tables provide a method to evaluate any formula under a partial truth assignment. Given any pta e : Var → T, we have, inductively, (1) true evaluates to 1 and false evaluates to 0, under any pta. (2) for a variable x ∈ Var, it evaluates to e(x). Definition 1 If a formula φ evaluates to 1 under a pta e according to the procedure outlined above, we write e |= φ and say that e supports φ, or φ evaluates to true under e, or e is a satisfier of φ. We write Mod(φ) for {e | e |= φ}, the set of satisfiers of φ.
Different interpretations for the logical connectives are possible. The ones given above correspond to the so called parallel (lazy) evaluation. Eager evaluation would have resulted in more ⊥ entries in the truth tables, while sequential evaluation would have resulted in asymmetric truth tables.
Notice that the truth tables above define nothing else but three functions ∧ : (T × T) → T, ∨ : (T × T) → T, and ¬ : T → T. But they should really be considered as functionals that provide three different ways to build new functions of type [Var → T] i (i = 1 or 2) to T from given ones.
Domain theory
Domain theory. introduced by Scott in the late 60's, provides a mathematical foundation for the design, definition, and implementation of programming languages, and for the specification and verification of programs. Its fundamental ideas are those of partial information and successive approximation. The notion of partial information is captured by a complete partial order (cpo).
Functions acting on cpos are those which preserve the limits of directed sets -this is the so-called continuity property. If one thinks of directed sets as an approximating schema for infinite objects, then members of the directed set can be thought of as finite approximations. Continuity makes sure that infinite objects can be approximated by finite computations.
An important property of continuous functions is that when ordered in appropriate ways, they form a complete partial order again. Thus a continuous function becomes once again an object in a partial order. The beauty of domain theory is that a higher-order object is treated just as another ordinary object.
We recall some basic definitions in domain theory below; for further information on domain theory, see, for example, [1, 3, 11, 19, 24, 27] .
Let (D, ) be a partial order. A subset X of D is directed if it is non-empty and for each pair of elements a, b ∈ X, there is an upper bound x ∈ X for {a, b}. A complete partial order (cpo) is a partial order (D, ) with a least element (⊥) and every directed subset X has a least upper bound (or join) X. Compact elements of a cpo (D, ) are those inaccessible by directed sets: a ∈ D is compact if for any directed set X of D, a X implies that there exits x ∈ X with a x. We write κ(D) for the set of compact elements of D. A cpo is algebraic if every element is the join of a directed set of compact elements. A set X ⊆ D is bounded if it has an upper bound. If a pair of elements {a, b} is bounded, we write a ↑ b. A cpo is bounded complete if every bounded set has a join. Bounded complete algebraic cpos are called Scott domains.
Let ( D, ) be a cpo. A subset O of D is said to be Scott open if
• O is upward-closed, i.e., ∀x ∈ O∀y ∈ D, x y implies y ∈ O, and • whenever X ⊆ D is directed and X ∈ O we have X ∩ O = ∅. Example 2 Let D be the set of all partial truth assignments from a countable set V of variables to {0, 1}. Technically this set can be expressed as the set of all functions from V to {0, 1, ⊥}, where ⊥ 0 and also ⊥ 1. Such functions can be ordered pointwise in the obvious way to form a complete partial order D. The compact elements of D are the truth assignments which are non-⊥ on a finite set of variables. A set X of such truth assignments is bounded if and only if none of the variables are assigned to conflicting values by different truth assignments, such as sending a variable x to 0 by one assignment in X while sending x to 1 by another assignment in X. D is moreover a Scott domain since any bounded set of truth assignments has a least upper bound, which is the truth assignment sending a variable to 0 if any of the truth assignment in the bounded set assigns the variable to 0, to 1 if any of the truth assignment in the bounded set assigns the variable to 1, and to ⊥ otherwise.
If φ is a propositional formula, then the set of satisfiers of φ, using Kleene's truth tables, is an open set in the Scott topology over D.
The Smyth powerdomain
Perhaps the most economical way to define the Smyth powerdomain is via compact, saturated subsets (see, for example, [1, 27] It is a fact that the Smyth powerdomain of any Scott domain is again a Scott domain.
Since we are mostly working with finite cpos in this paper, it is useful to keep in mind that for a finite Scott domain D, the Smyth powerdomain P(D) simply consists of nonempty, upward-closed sets ordered by reverse inclusion.
(A subset X is upward-closed if X = ↑X.)
Definition 3 Let (X, ) be a Scott domain: a consistently complete partial
order. An antichain is a finite nonempty set of pairwise incomparable compact elements of X.
We take antichains as representatives of (finite) disjunctive structures. These have the usual preorder:
Definition 4 (Smyth preorder) Let A and B be antichains on a domain (X, ). We say A B iff for all e ∈ B, there is some d ∈ A with d e.
The collection of finite antichains over a domain D represents the set of compact elements of the Smyth powerdomain P(D) of D in the sense that every compact element of the powerdomain is the upward closure of a finite antichain, and conversely the Smyth powerdomain is standardly defined by "ideal completion" of the finite antichains under the Smyth preorder, but we use the definition given above. For a proof of the equivalence between the "ideal completion" definition and our definition, see [1] .
Example 5 Let D be the set of all partial truth assignments considered earlier. If φ is a propositional formula, then the set of satisfiers of φ is a compact open set. The compact elements of the Smyth powerdomain P(D) correspond to the set of of satisfiers of propositional formulas. Example 7 Consider the domain of deductively closed sets of sentences. Then a default consists of a pair (ϕ, ψ), where ϕ and ψ are sentences, and θ is the deductive closure of the singleton set {θ}. This corresponds exactly to the normal default rule ϕ : ψ ψ in the sense of Reiter.
Default domain theory
We now present the general domain-theoretic version of Reiter's operator η (which he called Γ), used to build extensions of closed theories. In his case, x would be a theory W , e would be a theory E, and η(W, E) would be the smallest theory containing W and closed under E-consistent application of user-specified (normal) default rules in a set ∆. We paraphrase (2) by saying that y is invariant under e-consistent default application.
Reiter provides a way to construct the function η iteratively. This can be imitated in general Scott domains as well.
Lemma 9 Let (D, ) be a Scott domain. Let ∆ be a default set in D. We have η(x, e) = i≥0 η(x, e, i), where η(x, e, 0) = x, and
Before passing to the definition of extension, we mention two properties of the η operator which appear in the folklore of default theories, but hold in general.
Lemma 10
The function η(x, e) is monotonic in x for fixed e.
Lemma 11
The function η(x, e) is antimonotonic in e for fixed x.
These lemmas can be easily proved using the iterative definition of η. We return to our main business.
Definition 12
We call e ∈ D an extension of x ∈ D if η(x, e) = e.
Clearly extensions over the domain of first-order theories are exactly Reiter's extensions.
The next theorem states some properties of extensions in general Scott domains. In each case the proof is obtained by imitating the proof for first-order theories.
Theorem 13 Given a Scott domain D and a (normal) default set ∆, we have:
(1) Extensions always exist. Note that in the last property, we used bounded completeness of D to ensure the existence of x y.
Finally, we state a general notion of (skeptical) non-monotonic consequence over an arbitrary Scott domain, equipped with a default set ∆. Definition 14 Let d be a finite element and x an arbitrary element of a Scott domain (D, ). We say that x is a non-monotonic consequence of d, and write d |∼ x, if x e for every ∆-extension e of d.
Technically we should subscript |∼ with the default set ∆, but the default set will always be clear from context.
The Boolean hierarchy
Assuming the basic knowledge about the P and NP language classes for complexity, the boolean hierarchy (BH) [6, 7] is defined as follows:
Naturally, there are the complementary classes co-NP(i) = {L | L ∈ NP(i)}. Of particular interest to us is co-NP(3) and NP(4). We have
In [6] it is shown that the BH is exactly the Boolean closure of NP. One can think of the class as defined by Boolean expressions, where the basic expressions are NP predicates. Since the satisfiability problem sat for propositional logic is NP-complete and the tautology problem taut is co-NP-complete, we can use sat and taut as predicates over propositional formulas and use Boolean combinations of these predicates to construct problems complete in the Boolean hierarchy.
For example, deciding the truth of the formula
where p, q, r are propositional formulas, is co-NP(3)-complete. Similarly,
is an NP(4)-complete problem.
3 Power defaults
Examples
As we have said, our version of default logic is similar in spirit to that of Reiter's logic, but we use defaults in a very different setting. To motivate our definition, we use an example based on Gunter and Scott's introduction [11] to powerdomain theory.
Disjunctive descriptions of a fruit bag. Suppose I hold a bag of fruit, and I wish to give you information about what is in the bag. One such description might be "A fruit in the bag is a yellow fruit or a red fruit." This disjunctive description is based on two conjunctive items "yellow fruit" and "red fruit". A way to think of "yellow fruit" is as the partial function mapping the variables y to 1 and f to 1, and all other variables to an "undefined" element ⊥. We will just write yf for such an assignment. These assignments are partially ordered pointwise as maps from the set of variables into {0, 1} ⊥ , and form a Scott domain thereby. To model the disjunctive combination, we can therefore use the antichain {yf , rf }. Now the foregoing description is less informative than "A fruit in the bag is a yellow fruit or a cherry or a strawberry", and correspondingly we have {rf , yf } {rfc, rfs, yf }, where we have further qualified red fruit with cherry and strawberry features.
We next consider three-valued formulas. If φ is a propositional formula, and g is a partial truth assignment such that g |= φ, then in Kleene's system, for any f g, we have f |= φ. So, the set of satisfying partial truth assignments for a formula is the upward closure of the set of minimal satisfiers. In general, any such upward-closed set, is the set Mod(φ) of satisfiers of some formula φ. Consider the set MinMod(φ) of minimal satisfiers of a formula. It is easy to check that MinMod(φ) MinMod(ψ) iff Mod(φ) ⊇ Mod(ψ). Thus, the Smyth powerdomain P(D) is the set of (non-empty) upward-closed subsets of our domain D of partial truth assignments, ordered by reverse subset inclusion.
Semantic constraints and updates
In standard default logic, we represent constraints as pseudo-proof rules of the form τ : θ θ . (We consider only normal defaults in this paper.) The meaning is that if we have the formula τ in our theory, and θ is consistent with our desired "final" theory, then we can add θ. Standard default logic in fact works with a Scott domain: the domain of propositional theories, ordered by set-theoretic inclusion. Our default semantics works in exactly the same way, only using the Smyth powerdomain. So normal defaults will be objects of the form K : L L , where K and L are upward-closed sets of partial truth assignments. We will insist, however, that these defaults (which might as well be written as pairs (K, L)) be derived from our syntactic default constraints.
We now show how to obtain defaults in the Smyth powerdomain from syntactic constraints. Let us begin with an example. Suppose that we wish to say (1) By default, a piece of fruit in the bag is a red fruit or a yellow fruit.
This should be a defeasible statement if there is a grape in the bag. Further, if we have solid information that there is nothing red in the bag, we still should be able to infer by default that there is a piece of yellow fruit.
In our approach, default assertions such as (1) will be modelled by syntactic constraints of the form τ ; θ, where τ and θ are propositional formulas. Thus, (1) would read
Positive assertions of evidence are flat statements like f ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬y, coding the grape example, or just ¬r, coding the "no red things" assertion. (In general, these assertions are allowed to be disjunctive.) We might also want to state that there are no red fruits in the bag, just by default. This would provide another default constraint f ; ¬r.
The difficulty to keep in mind is that these defaults should permit reasoning by cases. We have a two-stage process. The intermediate stage is a construct called a semantic constraint. In the example (2), we would create a pair
where now f is a truth assignment defined to be 1 only on the variable f , and ↑{rf ,yf } stands for the upward closure of the (similarly notated) truth assignments rf and yf . In such a constraint, the set on the right is a Smyth powerdomain element, and the element on the left is just a truth assignment. If we were working with a more general constraint τ ; θ, we would create several semantic constraints of the form (d, θ) where d is a minimal satisfier of τ , and θ is used ambiguously to denote the upward closure of the set of minimal models of the syntactic formula θ.
The final stage in the creation of normal power defaults is to lift semantic constraints so that the first element of a pair is a Smyth powerdomain element. We do this as follows. If (d, θ) is a semantic constraint, then we add a large number of defaults to our system. Take any K such that d subsumes a This "update semantics" says that if we have a disjunctive description K at some stage, and some generator b of K entails a definite description d, then we can have all the disjunctive possibilities we had before, except that the description b can be improved by conjoining it with the description θ, where (d, θ) is a semantic constraint derived from our syntactic presentation. Notice that the updated K is a more informative description than K was.
In our example, suppose that we have the description K = ↑{rf , yf }. Consider the syntactic default f ; ¬r. This gives rise to a semantic constraint (f, ↑ {¬r}). Since f rf , we can update rf in K.
We could also update yf , deriving ↑{rf , yf ¬r }. Perhaps this would rule out orange fruit.
Power defaults on domains
With these examples in mind, we move to the official definition of power defaults. 
is an update of A, provided it is not empty.
This definition is due to Libkin [15] . It says that an elementary way to improve information in a compact open set is to improve one of its generators. Notice that "improving" a generator is represented by intersection here, corresponding to the Smyth ordering.
Example 17 A general picture of updating is presented in Figure 1 . In this picture, the set A is the upward closure of the three element set {a1, a2, a3}. The set θ is indicated by lighter lines in the top half of the figure. It is generated by the set {t1, t2}. To update a1, we remove this element from the set of generators of A, and take the upward closure of {a1, a2}. This leaves the other two dark "cones" intact. Then we add back in the set ( ↑a1) ∩ θ. This results in the two new generators t and u shown above a1 in the figure.
The next definition provides the actual lifting of default constraints to the powerdomain setting. Recall that a normal default set in any domain has to be a relation whose field is the set of finite elements of that domain.
Definition 18
Let Γ be a set of default constraints over P(D). The default set ∆ Γ determined by Γ is the set of pairs
When clear from context, we omit the subscript Γ.
In general, for arbitrary Scott domains, we simply provide Γ as a set of semantic constraints. But when we have a syntax, we can derive the semantic constraints from syntactic ones as in the case of 3-valued logic. This is done by considering each pair τ ; θ of formulas, and adding all semantic constraints of the form (d, θ) where d is a minimal satisfier of τ , and θ is (by abuse of notation) the set of satisfiers of the syntactic formula θ.
Characterizing extensions
Now, we can turn the crank of Reiter's extension mechanism. Using our Smyth power defaults, we define extensions in exactly the same way that they were defined for default logic. We start with a powerdomain element. Then we "iterate" the defaults induced from Σ. What happens, in effect, is that instead of getting larger and larger theories, as in standard default logic, our ordering is reversed, and we get smaller and smaller sets of partial models. Thus the whole enterprise is really directed the same way as in standard default logic; the difference is that we have used partiality in the underlying domain, and have preserved it in the Smyth powerdomain. In this section we establish basic properties associated with extensions derived from power defaults in the Smyth powerdomain.
Our first objective is the Dichotomy Theorem. It requires the following basic definition.
Definition 19
Let D be a Scott domain, Γ be a set of semantic default constraints, and M a nonempty compact open subset of D. An element e ∈ D is said to be safe if (1) e ∈ M, and (2) for any semantic constraint (d, θ) ∈ Γ, if d e then ↑e ∩ θ = ↑e.
Further, an extension E of M is said to be safe if there is a safe element e ∈ E.
The idea of the definition is that a safe element e is one to which none of the applicable defaults can add any new information. Of course, the idea of safety is with respect to starting information; this is why we have the initial information M.
Remark 20
In the example of three-valued propositional logic, it is easy to see that if M is the set of minimal satisfiers of a formula φ, and Σ is a set of syntactic default constraints of the form (τ, θ), then an partial truth assignment e is safe if and only if (i) e |= φ, and (ii) for each τ ; θ ∈ Σ, if e |= τ , then e |= θ.
Our first main result characterizes extensions using the concept of safe elements.
Theorem 21 (Dichotomy Theorem) Let Γ be a set of semantic constraints, and let ∆ be the associated set of Smyth power defaults. If the compact saturated set M contains a safe element, then there will be a unique safe ∆-extension E of M. If M does not contain a safe element, then the (multiple) extensions of M will all be of the form ↑g, for certain g ∈ M.
The proof of the Dichotomy Theorem rests on several lemmas. The first of these is just a restatement for the Smyth powerdomain of the extension operator (Definition 8).
Lemma 22 Let M and W be compact saturated sets. The set η(M, W ) is the inclusion-largest compact saturated set Y such that
Now we turn to a lemma giving us information about general compact saturated sets. Recall that µA is the set of minimal elements of A. For any element x ∈ A, we want to show that there exists a minimal element y ∈ A such that x y.
Fix an arbitrary element x ∈ A, consider a chain C of ↓x ∩ A. The greatest lower bound of C, C, exists in D, since the set of all lower bounds of C is nonempty; and it is directed because of the following argument. Two lower bounds of C certainly subsume some element of C, so their least upper bound subsumes the same element of C. This least upper bound subsumes any other element of C, because any element of C is an upper bound for both lower bounds of C. Thus the set of lower bounds of C is in fact directed, and has a least upper bound C. We show that C is a member of ↓x ∩ A, as well.
Let O be any compact open set containing A. Clearly, C ⊆ O. Since O is compact, µO is a finite set, and O = ↑µO. This implies that there exists some a ∈ µO such that C ⊆ ↑ a, and hence C ∈ ↑ a, which implies C ∈ O. Therefore, C is a member of every compact open set containing A.
To summarize, we have shown that for any element x ∈ A, the nonempty set ↓x ∩ A has the property that every chain in it has a lower bound. By Zorn's lemma, ↓x ∩ A has a minimal element, say, y. Such a y is a minimal element of A subsuming x. 2
The next lemma gives an "approximation property" for compact saturated sets in any Scott domain. It will be needed to deal with general extensions, because these are "limits" of compact opens, not compact opens themselves. We call it the Interpolation Theorem. This is applied to yield the Dichotomy Theorem.
Lemma 24 (Interpolation Theorem) Let E be a compact saturated set over a coherent algebraic dcpo, g be a minimal element of E, and d be a compact element subsuming g.
the minimal element l of L subsuming g is unique, and (3) d l.
PROOF. Choose a minimal element f of K subsuming g. Let l be the least upper bound of d and f , so that l g.
Consider the collection C of all ↑x for x ∈ R together with ↑l. We claim that this is an open cover of E. In proof, let e ∈ E. Without loss of generality, g does not subsume e. Hence by algebraicity of Scott domains, there is a compact element n ∈ D such that n e but n does not subsume g. Since e ∈ E, then there is a b ∈ µK with b e. Then the least upper bound m of b and n is in K ∩ K(D), so that m subsumes e but not g. Thus C is an open cover of E. By compactness, C has a finite subcover for E. The union of the sets of this subcover has the desired properties. 2
This completes the lemmas which hold in general; now we consider extensions explicitly. In the next lemma, we use the "iterative" characterization (Lemma 9) of the function η, restated for the Smyth powerdomain. We use the following abbreviation: for sets U and W , put
Now we give the iterative definition of the function η as follows:
Lemma 25
If there is a safe element e under a system of constraints, then for any powerdomain element W , we have e ∈ η(M, W ).
PROOF.
We show e ∈ η(M, W, n) for all n. If n = 0, then this is just (i) of Definition 19. Assume e ∈ η(M, W, n).
If a does not subsume e, then e remains in the updated K, and so e must be in η(M, W, n + 1). Otherwise a e, so that ↑a ⊇ ↑e. But then ↑a ∩ θ ⊇ ↑e ∩ θ = ↑e. So e is still in the next approximation η(M, W, n + 1). 2
Lemma 26
If E is a safe extension of M with respect to Γ, then E = ↑{e ∈ M | e is a safe element}.
In other words, if there exists a safe element, then the extension is just the upward-closure of all safe elements.
PROOF. Given Lemma 23 and Lemma 25, all we need to show is that every generator of a safe extension is a safe element. Let g be a generator of the safe extension E. If g is not safe, then there is a semantic constraint (d, θ) such that d g but ↑g ∩ θ ⊂ ↑g. We specify a compact open set K including E, where d subsumes one of its generators y, such that
is not empty, and (ii) is not equal to E. This violates Lemma 22, as E = η(M, E).
We define K as follows. Apply the Interpolation Theorem using X = M and the elements d and g in the previous paragraph. Let K be the obtained set Y , and y ∈ K be the unique generator of K subsuming g. Since d y, and since the updated set K[y ← y ∩ θ] still contains a safe element e ∈ E, the default (K, K[y ← y ∩ θ]) is applicable. But since g / ∈ θ, we have our desired contradiction. 2 PROOF. (Dichotomy Theorem) Suppose M has a safe extension E. By Lemma 26, E is the unique extension of M, being the upward closure of the set of safe elements in M.
To show that unsafe extensions are singleton generated, let g 1 and g 2 be distinct non-safe generators of E. Since g 1 is unsafe, there is a semantic constraint (d, θ) such that d g 1 but g 1 ∈ θ. By the algebraic property of D, there is a compact element d such that d d g 1 , but g 2 ∈ ↑ d . Now apply the Interpolation Theorem and let K be a compact open superset of E which has a unique generator g subsuming g 2 , and, moreover, d
g. The update of K at g with respect to (d, θ) is consistent with E, since g 2 is a common member; however, the update is no longer a superset of E because it does not contain g 1 . 2
We now turn to the next main result:
Theorem 27 (Extension Splitting Theorem) Let ∆ be a set of normal defaults determined as in Definition 18. Consider two nonempty compact saturated sets W 1 and W 2 . Then any extension E of W 1 ∪ W 2 , using ∆ as the default set, can be written as a union E = E 1 ∪E 2 , where E 1 and E 2 are either empty or extensions of W 1 and W 2 respectively.
Before beginning the proof, let us consider the example of three-valued logic to show how this theorem sanctions reasoning by cases. Let Σ be a set of default constraints τ ; θ. Let φ, χ, and ψ be three-valued propositional formulas. Suppose that φ |∼ Σ ψ. This means that every extension of Mod(φ) is contained in Mod(ψ), where Mod(φ) is just the set of all partial truth assignments satisfying φ. Similarly suppose χ |∼ Σ ψ.
We want to show that φ ∨ χ |∼ Σ ψ; by definition, this means that every extension of Mod(φ ∨ χ) is a subset of Mod(ψ). Since
the result follows immediately from the Splitting Theorem.
PROOF. (Extension Splitting Theorem) Apply the Dichotomy Theorem. Suppose first that E is a safe extension of W 1 ∪ W 2 . All safe elements of W 1 ∪ W 2 are in E, and a safe element of E is either a safe element of W 1 or a safe element of W 2 . So, if W 1 ∩ µE is non-empty then it is the set of all minimal safe elements of W 1 . This means that it must be the set of generators of the unique safe extension E 1 of W 1 . Similar remarks apply to W 2 , giving us the set E 2 . Now suppose that there are no safe elements in W 1 ∪ W 2 . Then by Dichotomy, E = ↑g for some g in W 1 ∪ W 2 . Without loss of generality, g ∈ W 1 . Then we have (
so that by Theorem 13, item(5), ↑g is an extension of W 1 . If g ∈ W 2 as well, then similar remarks show that ↑g is an extension of W 2 . 2
The above proof of the Splitting Theorem is nonconstructive (note the use of Zorn's Lemma in Lemma 23). Our original proof was much more constructive, but gave no hint of the general picture of Smyth power extensions. Here is a quick overview of that proof, which does make use of new properties of the extension operator η in any Scott domain.
The first lemma is specific to the Smyth powerdomain:
This lemma can be proved by induction. But the proof is not easy, and depends on establishing essentially the structural lemma needed for the induction step by assuming that the sets W 1 and W 2 are compact open, that is, finite elements of the Smyth powerdomain. We have to overcome the fact, though, that the lemma is false unless E is an extension of W 1 ∪ W 2 . This is handled using a special combinatorial argument. We then argue using continuity considerations that the needed structural lemma holds for general compact saturated sets.
In the midst of all of this we have to change the set of defaults.
Once we have attained Lemma 28, we still need to show how it entails the Splitting Theorem. This comes from a new and general fact about extensions in any Scott domain. We therefore include the proof.
Theorem 29 Let ∆ be a default set in a Scott domain, and suppose x y, and that e is an extension of x. If η(y, e) is not , then it is an extension of y.
PROOF. Suppose x y. By Lemma 10, we have η(x, e) η(y, e). But η(x, e) = e, so e η(y, e). By Lemma 11, η(y, η(y, e)) η(y, e). The lemma will now follow if we can show that η(y, e) η(y, η(y, e)). We do this by induction, showing that for each i η(y, e, i) η(y, η(y, e), i).
The basis is clear. Assume the result for i. By definition η(y, e, i + 1) = η(y, e, i)
Now notice that any b's used on the right actually subsume η(y, e), because η(y, e) is the least upper bound of all the η(y, e, i) as i goes to infinity. Therefore the expression on the right subsumes
by inductive hypothesis and our observation on the b's. But the last line is just η(y, η(y, e), i + 1). 2
The Splitting Theorem follows if we take e = E, x = W 1 ∪W 2 , and successively y = W 1 , then y = W 2 in Theorem 29 (recall that the ordering in the Smyth powerdomain is reverse inclusion.)
Algorithms and completeness
Let Σ be a set of default (syntactic) constraints, and φ, ψ be formulas in a propositional logic L. The triple S = (φ, Σ, ψ) is called a system. The set V S is the set of propositional variables appearing anywhere in S; D(V S ), or simply D, is the set of partial truth assignments over this finite set, and P(D) is its Smyth powerdomain. The set of power defaults is given in the next definition which is a specialization of Definition 18.
Definition 30
The set Γ of semantic constraints consists of, for each syntactic constraint τ ; θ in Σ, pairs of the form (d, θ) where d is a minimal satisfier of τ , and θ is (by abuse of notation) the set of satisfiers of the syntactic formula θ. The set of power defaults ∆ Σ consists of pairs
The main results of this section are:
(1) The skeptical non-monotonic inference problem (SNIP) with respect to a system S = (φ, Σ, ψ) is co-NP(3)-complete for strict three valuedpropositional logic. "Strict" means that the formula true is not used. As a consequence, the truth value of a formula is always ⊥ under the completely undefined partial truth assignment. As is in [9] , the size of a system S = (φ, Σ, ψ) is the total number of symbols occurring in S, which is a sum of the sizes of the formula φ, ψ and all formulas in Σ. Note that the size of a system always dominate the total number of variables occurring in the system. (2) General SNIP is NP(4)-complete, where the formula true can be used.
The idea behind of our algorithms is based on the structure of extensions in the Kleene logic setting. This section first specializes, without proof, the Dichotomy Theorem to the special case of propositional logic. We then turn to a in-depth analysis of non-safe extensions.
Definition 31 With respect to a formula φ and a set Σ of syntactic constraints, a partial truth assignment e is safe if (1) e |= φ, and (2) for every syntactic constraint τ ; θ in Σ, if e |= τ , then e |= θ.
Corollary 32 The problem of determining, for a formula φ and set Σ of syntactic constraints, whether there is a safe element with respect to these, is NP-complete.
PROOF.
To check whether there is a safe element, we guess a partial truth assignment e. Then, by Definition 31, we can check if e is safe in polynomial time. The hardness proof is a simple reduction from CNF-SAT. 2
As a result of the Dichotomy Theorem and the above corollary, we have the next result, which is simply a restatement in this specific propositional setting.
Corollary 33 For a system of constraints Σ and satisfiable formula φ, we have (1) if there is a safe element e under a system of constraints, then the set M of satisfiers of (a satisfiable) φ has a unique extension, which is safe. (2) either there is a unique safe extension E of M = Mod(φ), or no extensions are safe. (3) it is an NP-complete problem to decide if a system has a (unique) safe extension.
Non-safe extensions
Now we turn to the analysis of non-safe (we also say unsafe) extensions. This is a little more subtle than the safe case, but also a little more surprising.
Our first result is easy, but a bit unexpected. It uses Lemma 22.
Lemma 34 If E is a non-safe extension of M, then E = ↑ g for a single element g of D.
PROOF. Suppose E has at least two generators g and h. Then since these generators are not safe, one of them can be properly updated, and the result will still be E-consistent (we do not update the other). This violates invariance of E under E-consistent rule application. 2
Because of this result, we can turn attention to criteria for deciding if a system has a "singleton" extension ↑g.
Refer again to the conditions in Lemma 22. We are interested in W = ↑ g, and we seek a characterization of the condition η(M, ↑ g) = ↑ g. We fix a terminology to make the description easier.
Definition 35 With respect to a system of constrants Σ and satisfiable formula φ, a compact open set Y is called g-invariant for a partial truth as-
Lemma 36 Assume that there are no safe elements. Let g ∈ M, and assume g = ⊥. Then the set ↑g is g-invariant if and only if g is a maximal element of the finite domain D of partial truth assignments (for φ and Σ).
PROOF. Assume first that there are two or more propositional variables in φ and Σ. Let g ∈ M be an (unsafe) element which is not maximal. By assumption, g = ⊥. Since g is unsafe, there is a constraint (d, θ) (derived from some syntactic constraint τ ; θ in Σ) with d g, but g ∈ θ. Since g is not maximal, and not ⊥, then at least one variable x must be set to a 0 or 1 value in g, and another variable y to ⊥. Define a g g by setting y to 0 ( 1 would also do); and then let a be obtained from g by setting x to ⊥. Then the set K = {a, g} has two incomparable generators, and contains g. The set
furthermore is consistent with ↑g, and properly updates ↑g. Thus ↑g is not g-invariant.
Conversely, suppose that g is maximal in M. We now analyze the condition that such a g-invariant set {g} is the largest g-invariant Y with Y ⊆ M.
Lemma 37 Assume there are no safe elements, and let g ∈ M be maximal and Y ⊆ M be g-invariant. Then Y is not a subset of {g} if and only if all generators y of Y strictly subsume g (i.e. y g).
PROOF. Assume Y is as stated, with a generator y 0 not subsuming g. We show that y 0 must be safe -a contradiction.
Consider a constraint τ ; θ with y 0 |= τ . Let K = Y ∪ {g}. We claim that K is still g-invariant. This is clear if g ∈ Y . If not, then we have {g} ∩ Y = ∅. So any updates whose result is g-consistent have to apply either to generators of Y or to g itself. By Lemma 36, since g is maximal, {g} is g-invariant. So these updates cannot affect g. Now consider the generator y 0 of K. The set K[y 0 ← y 0 ∩ θ] is certainly consistent with {g} since the update leaves g unaffected. But since by assumption K is g-invariant, and g is also g-invariant (by Lemma 36), K = Y ∪ {g} is g-invariant. We have y 0 |= θ. So y 0 is safe. The converse is trivial. 2
The next lemma reduces the search for g-invariant sets even more.
Lemma 38 Under the conditions stated above, if Y is a g-invariant set, then it must be singleton-generated.
PROOF. If Y is a subset of {g}, then there is nothing to prove. So suppose Y ⊆ {g}. By the previous lemma, all generators of Y must (strictly) subsume g. Suppose there are more than one generators for Y . Fix one of the generators y 0 of Y . Since y 0 is unsafe, there is some τ ; θ ∈ Σ such that y 0 |= τ , but
, and we get a proper update -a contradition. 2
Our next lemma is the real surprise.
Lemma 39 If there is no safe element, and {g} is a g-invariant set with g maximal and g ∈ M, then there is no y 0 g, y 0 = ⊥, and y 0 ∈ M such that ↑y 0 is g-invariant.
PROOF. Let y 0 ∈ M, and y 0 g with y 0 = ⊥. Since y 0 is not safe, there is a constraint (d, θ) with d y 0 , such that y 0 / ∈ ( ↑y 0 ∩ θ). Choose another element r ∈ D with r g but r incomparable with y 0 . Since g is maximal and y 0 = ⊥, this is certainly possible. Consider the default pair
The second element of this pair still contains g because r g. But the default properly updates y 0 . 2 Theorem 40 Assume that there are no safe elements for the system (φ, Σ, ψ). If ⊥ |= φ (i.e., φ is not equivalent to true), then the extensions of M = Mod(φ) are those singleton sets {g} such that g is maximal and g |= φ.
PROOF. Since we assume that φ is not equivalent to true, the result follows immediately from Lemma 36 and Lemma 39. 2
SNIP
The next definition is a specialization of skeptical non-monotonic consequence relation (Definition 14) to power default reasoning in propositional logic.
(2) Using Corollary 32 once again, guess an element e, verify that it is safe (this entails satisfying φ), and further does not satisfy ψ. If this branch of the algorithm succeeds, then there is a safe extension with a generator not satisfying ψ, since the element e must be above a generator of a safe extension. If the generator satisfied ψ, then e would too, by persistence. Conversely, if there is a safe extension, with a generator not satisfying ψ, we know by Corollary 33 that every generator is safe. Our algorithm guesses all possible safe elements in M = Mod(φ), so it must succeed on such a generator. Note that it does not have to check that what it has found is actually a generator! (3) At this point, we know that there are no safe extensions. We now check for the existence of a non-safe extension (necessarily of the form {g}) such that g |= ψ. Given the triple (φ, Σ, ψ), we continue with the following steps. (4) First, nondeterministically guess a maximal element g of D(V S ). (5) Check that g |= φ. If not, fail. Otherwise go to the next step. (6) When this step is reached, we know that g is an extension of M. Check that g |= ψ. If so, succeed, otherwise fail.
2
The hardness proof uses a standard complete language for co-NP(3):
where the predicates sat and taut are as explained in Subsection 2.5.
Theorem 43 (co-NP(3)-Completeness) SNIP is co-NP(3)-complete.
PROOF. We only have to establish that the problem is hard for co-NP(3). Given any boolean expression triple (P, Q, R), we construct an instance of skeptical non-monotonic consequence as follows. First, rename the boolean variables so that P, Q and R do not share common variables.
Now introduce a single default constraint, ¬R ; P ∧ i∈I (x i ∨ ¬x i ), where {x i | i ∈ I} is the set of all variables appearing in P, Q, or R, after the renaming of variables.
We can then show that
if and only if ¬R |∼ Σ P ∧ Q. 2
Here are some special types of systems for which the safety test is simple; so our overall complexity is reduced.
Definition 44 A system (φ, Σ, ψ) is conjunctive iff the formula φ and all of the formulas θ appearing as default conclusions contain no occurrences of ∨.
Theorem 45 There is a polynomial-time algorithm to decide whether or not a conjunctive system is safe.
The proof shows how to inductively construct a (singleton) safe extension if there is one.
Corollary 46
The skeptical entailment problem for conjunctive systems is in co-NP.
Corollary 47
The previous corollary holds for systems which are conjunctive, except that the starting formula is allowed to be a disjunction of conjunctions.
Corollary 48 For a conjunctive system, the question of whether the system is safe and φ |∼ ψ can be answered in polynomial time.
Corollary 49 If in a conjunctive system (φ, Σ, ψ), the formula ψ is in DNF and is not equal to true, and φ is in DNF, then the skeptical inference problem is in P .
NP(4)-completeness for general SNIP
This subsection focuses on systems S = (φ, Σ, ψ) where Mod(φ) = ↑⊥, i.e., φ is equivalent to true. Since the Dichotomy Theorem works for the Smyth powerdomain of any Scott domain, the system still has only two kinds of extensions: safe and unsafe ones. Corollary 32 remains to be true: it is an NP-complete problem to test if systems S = (φ, Σ, ψ) with Mod(φ) = ↑⊥ has a safe extension.
The co-NP(3)-completeness result in the previous subsection rests on an analysis of unsafe extensions given that φ is not equivalent to true. We start this section with an analysis of unsafe extensions for systems S = (φ, Σ, ψ) where Mod(φ) = ↑⊥.
By the Dichotomy Theorem and Lemma 26, for each member e of the domain D(V S ) of partial truth assignments over the variable set V S associated with system S, there exists some τ ; θ ∈ Σ, such that e |= τ but e |= θ.
Lemma 36 concludes that for g = ⊥, the set ↑g is g-invariant if and only if g is a maximal element of D(V S ), i.e., a classical 0-1 truth assignment. We now establish conditions under which the set ↑ ⊥ = D(V S ) is ⊥-invariant. According to Definition 35, ↑⊥ is ⊥-invariant if whenever Lemma 51 For systems S = (φ, Σ, ψ) where Mod(φ) = ↑⊥, if there exists a constraint τ ; θ ∈ Σ such that Mod(τ ) = ↑⊥, Mod(θ) = ↑⊥, and Mod(θ) = ∅, then E is an unsafe extensions of φ if and only if E = {g} for some maximal partial truth assignment g.
With these preparations in mind, we can state the second main result of this section.
Theorem 52 General SNIP is NP(4)-complete.
PROOF. We use the following complete problem for NP(4):
INSTANCE: A quadruple (P, Q, R, S) of classical Boolean formulas. PROPERTY: taut(P ) ∧ (sat(Q) ∨ (sat(R) ∧ taut(S))).
Hardness: We transform a quadruple (P, Q, R, S) into an instance of entailment as follows. Make sure the variables of P , Q, R and S are disjoint. Construct two syntactic constraints:
Σ := {true ; (Q ∨ R) ∧ i∈I (x i ∨ ¬x i ), true ; Q ∧ i∈I (x i ∨ ¬x i )}, where {x i | i ∈ I} is the set of the occurring variables. We show that
if and only if (P, Q, R, S) is a correct instance of the problem above.
Only if: Suppose true |∼ Σ P ∧ [Q ∨ (R ∧ S)] is valid. Clearly, P must be a tautology no matter what, because extensions always exist and they are captured by formulas with variables disjoint from those in P . Either (i) the extension is safe, or (ii) there are no safe extensions. For (i), we have Q satisfiable, and the tuple (P, Q, R, S) is a correct instance of the problem above. For (ii), we have Q unsatisfiable. Since we cannot have ↑⊥ as an extension here, R must be satisfiable. So, S must be a tautology for true |∼ Σ P ∧ [Q ∨ (R ∧ S)] to be valid.
If: Suppose (P, Q, R, S) is a valid quadruple. We know that P is a tautology. If Q is satisfiable, then we have a unique safe extension captured by Q, and clearly true |∼ Σ P ∧ [Q ∨ (R ∧ S)] is valid. Suppose Q is unsatisfiable. Then by assumption R is satisfiable and S a tautology. In this case we have only unsafe extensions, characterized by total truth assignments satisfying R. Once again, we can see that true |∼ Σ P ∧ [Q ∨ (R ∧ S)] is valid.
(Membership) Note that
We show that true |∼ Σ ψ is in co-NP(4). Suppose ψ is not true. Our algorithm succeeds in one of the following cases:
(1) (NP) either find a safe element satisfying ¬ψ, or (2) (co-NP) it verifies that no elements are safe, and further checks that (a) (co-NP) either none of the θ is satisfiable for true ; θ ∈ Σ, or (b) (NP) there exists an element satisfying one of the θ and ¬ψ at the same time.
The above combination of Boolean operators on NP-oracles puts the problem squarely into the co-NP(4) class, and so SNIP is in NP(4) in this case.
6 Characterizing non-monotonic consequence relation
The Cautious Monotony law is one of the patterns of inference said to form a "core" collection of rules for any reasonable logical non-monotonic reasoning system. It reads as:
If φ |∼ ψ and φ |∼ γ, then φ ∧ γ |∼ ψ, where now |∼ is some sort of general relation between formulas.
Theorem 53 The Cautious Monotony law holds with |∼ taken to be |∼ Σ .
The proof is by the Dichotomy Theorem, analayzing the safe and unsafe cases separately.
Theorem 54 With respect to a set Σ of syntactic constraints, the following set of laws hold for the skeptical non-monotonic consequence relation of propositional logic.
• Left Logical Equivalence: (p = q) & (p ; r) ⇒ q ; r.
• Right Weakening: (p ; q) & (q ≤ r) ⇒ p ; r.
• Cautious Cut: (p ; q)&(p ∧ q ; r) ⇒ p ; r.
• Cautious Monotony: (p ; q) & (p ; r) ⇒ p ∧ q ; r.
• Right And: (p ; q) & (p ; r) ⇒ (p ; q ∧ r).
As we showed earlier, the Or laws follow from the Extension Splitting Theorem. We omit the routine proofs for the rest of the items.
Concluding remarks
By interpreting default reasoning in the Smyth powerdomain and using Kleene's strong three-valued system, we have obtained co-NP(3) and NP(4) completeness results for propositional default reasoning, a significant improvement (assuming NP =P) over previous results using different definitions. We feel that for experimental purposes, localizing relevant information before applying the defaults may cut down the complexity further. In general, the domain theoretic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning makes it possible to prove desirable structural properties which do not hold in the standard case.
Experimental results on non-monotonic inference with power defaults have in fact been obtained; see [13] for experiments comparing power default inference to a variety of other systems. The results show that in some experimental settings, power defaults work better than standard systems, and in other cases, not as well. It can be concluded that PDR is competitive with other systems in the experimental settings considered.
